Campbell Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 2 North Carolina 2010

Article 5

2010

The People Versus Corporate Welfare: North
Carolina's Forsaken Opportunity to Reverse
Perversion of the Commerce Clause and to
Reinvigorate the Public Purpose Doctrine
Jeanette K. Doran

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jeanette K. Doran, The People Versus Corporate Welfare: North Carolina's Forsaken Opportunity to Reverse Perversion of the Commerce
Clause and to Reinvigorate the Public Purpose Doctrine, 33 Campbell L. Rev. 381 (2010).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.

Doran: The People Versus Corporate Welfare: North Carolina's Forsaken Op

The People versus Corporate Welfare: North
Carolina's Forsaken Opportunity to Reverse
Perversion of the Commerce Clause and to
Reinvigorate the Public Purpose Doctrine
JEANETTE K. DORAN*

INTRODUCTION

Public debate surrounding so-called "economic development
incentives" has reverberated around the country.' These incentives are
doled out in a variety of forms, including tax credits, direct cash
subsidies and tax exemptions, purportedly designed to stimulate
economic development by facilitating location or retention of industry.2
Economists, attorneys and public officials have long debated the
effectiveness of these measures, particularly relative to the cost of
incentives.3 The use of incentives has devolved into what some consider
* Jeanette Doran earned her Juris Doctor cum laude from the Norman A. Wiggins
School of Law at Campbell University in 2000. After beginning her caeer in criminal
defense, she limited her practice in 2005 to constitutional law upon joining the North
Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law where she currently serves as senior staff
attorney.
1. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Special Report: Corporate Welfare, TIME
available at http://mega.nulampp/timecorpwelfare.html
MAGAZINE, Nov. 9, 1998,
aimed at attracting business); Charles E. McLure, Jr.,
subsidies
and
state
local
(discussing
Tax Competition: Is What's Good for the Private Goose also Good for the Public Gander?, 39
NAT'L TAXJ. 341, 341-43 (1986).
2. See Mark L. Nachbar et al., Income Taxes: State Tax Credits and Incentives, Tax
Mgmt. (BNA) No. 1180 (Jan. 26, 1996).
3. See Peter Fisher & Alan Peters, The Failures of Economic Development Incentives,
70 J. AMER. PLANNING Assoc. 27, 35 (2004) (concluding that business incentives-including tax incentives--are not efficacious and that "there is a need for a radical
transformation of policy ideas on how we achieve local economic growth"); James A.
Papke, Interjurisdictional Business-Tax Cost Differentials: Convergence, Divergence, and
Significance?, 9 STATE TAX NOTES 1701 (1995) (noting a study "cast[ingl doubt on the
proposition that general tax incentives can have a decisive impact on investment location
decisions"); Richard D. Pomp, The Role of State Tax Incentives in Attracting and Retaining
Business: A View from New York, 29 TAX NOTES 521, 525 (1985) (concluding, after
extensive review of the literature, that business tax incentives play only an insignificant
"role in attracting or maintaining [in-state] firms ... [and] probably results in a needless
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a tax war with one expert going so far as to describe the incentives
competition as a "second Civil War."'
Among the justifications for the use of incentives is the argument
that states have been caught in a "prisoner's dilemma."' That is, no state
would give away incentives if each could ensure that no other state
would.6 Closer to home in North Carolina, the court of appeals
seemingly adopted an "everybody-else-is-doing-it" rationale for
incentives when it began its opinion in a case challenging the
constitutionality of incentives with this quote from a law review article:
"Today every state provides tax and other economic incentives ....
Against the backdrop of popular and academic debate, a series of
lawsuits has challenged various incentives packages crafted for select
corporations in North Carolina.' While the litigation in North Carolina
and the evolution of our constitutional jurisprudence cannot impact
directly the national legal debate, such cases bring into focus longstanding principles of constitutional law.9 While a debate over the
public policy questions related to corporate "incentives" may occur
loss of state revenue"). But see William J. Barrett, VII, Problems with State Aid to New or
Expanding Businesses, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1024-25 (1985) (citing a Fortune study
showing the practical importance of business incentives). For a review of economic
studies and surveys in this area, see Robert Lynch, The Effectiveness of State and Local Tax
Cuts and Incentives: A Review of the Literature, 11 STATE TAX NOTES 949 (1996)
(summarizing the major findings of hundreds of studies).
4. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints
on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 378 (1996).
5. Matthew Schaefer, State Investment Attraction Subsidy Wars Resulting from a
Prisoner's Dilemma: The Inadequacy of State Constitutional Solutions and the
Appropriateness of a Federal Legislative Response, 28 N.M. L. REv. 303, 303 (1998).
6. Id. at 303.
7. Blinson v. State, 651 S.E.2d 268, 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Walter
Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development
Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 789, 790 (1996)); see also Maready v. City of WinstonSalem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 626-27 (N.C. 1996) ("To date, courts in forty-six states have
upheld the constitutionality of governmental expenditures and related assistance for
economic development incentives.").
8. See, e.g., Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 618-19 (challenging "twenty-four economic
development incentive projects entered into by the City [of Winston-Salem] or [Forsyth]
County"); Munger v. State, 689 S.E.2d 230, 234 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010), cert. granted, 689
S.E.2d 230 (2010) (challenging various incentive packages to subsidize an internet data
center by Google); Blinson, 651 S.E.2d at 271 (considering incentives awarded by state
and local government to Dell, Inc., a computer manufacturer); Peacock v. Shinn, 533
S.E.2d 842, 846 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (considering the constitutionality of a contract
between local government and a professional basketball team).
9. See Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 623-24 (collecting cases discussing the evolution of
the public purpose doctrine allowing for disbursement of public funds).
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around these cases,'o the heart of the issue rests squarely on the timehonored concept that our constitution is the cornerstone of all law and
that any act of the legislature inconsistent with the constitution must
fail."
Most cases challenging corporate incentives in North Carolina have
focused on state constitutional provisions, including prohibitions on the
award of exclusive emoluments and the public purpose doctrine, both of
which have been a part of North Carolina's legal heritage since the state's
first constitution in 1776 and have been added to over the years either
by amendment or by virtue of the constitution of 1868 and revision of
1971.1'
However, one case presented North Carolina with the
opportunity to lead the nation in reversing the perversion of the
Commerce Clause in the United States Constitution. Sadly, North
Carolina's courts did not accept the mantle of that leadership, opting
instead to affirm a dismissal of the Commerce Clause challenge at the
court of appeals and rejecting discretionary review by the supreme
court.13
This Article neither espouses judicial intervention in any political
controversy nor offers "broad" and "sweeping" constitutional theories.
Instead, this Article is calculated to recognize the efforts of taxpayers
who have resorted to the very constitutional rights afforded to them as
citizens and taxpayers to challenge governmental acts which are
repugnant to the very foundations of our society and to encourage the
judiciary to fulfill its duty to reject legislation which is contrary to the
state or federal constitution. As the North Carolina Supreme Court

10. See Anne C. Choe, Blinson v. State and the Continued Erosion of the Public Purpose
Doctrine in North Carolina, 87 N.C. L. REV. 644, 663 (2009) ("Although courts and
commentators have stated many legal arguments in order to analyze the respective roles
of the judiciary and the legislature in making decisions regarding economic development
incentives, policy arguments also creep into the debate at certain points.").
11. See Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 360 S.E.2d 756, 761 (N.C. 1987) ("It is well
settled in this State that the courts have the power, and it is their duty in proper cases, to
declare an act of the General Assembly unconstitutional-but it must be plainly and
clearly the case. If there is any reasonable doubt, it will be resolved in favor of the lawful
exercise of their powers by the representatives of the people." (quoting Glenn v. Bd. of
Educ., 187 S.E. 781, 784 (N.C. 1936))); see also Kornegay v. City of Goldsboro, 105 S.E.
187, 189 (N.C. 1920) (discussing the scope of judicial review of legislative acts).
12. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3; see also Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 623 (collecting cases
discussing the evolution of the public purpose doctrine).
13. Blinson v. State, 651 S.E.2d 268 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), disc. rev. denied, 661
S.E.2d 240 (N.C. 2008).
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stated in the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell" case: "The
principle of equal rights to all, and special privileges to none, is
fundamental

. . . ."15

This Article first addresses briefly the appropriateness of judicial
review of taxpayer challenges to corporate welfare packages in Part I,
analyzes the Commerce Clause flaws in targeted tax incentives packages
in Part II, and discusses one state's declaration of the constitutional
infirmity of corporate welfare in Part III.
I.

THE APPROPRIATENESS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW GENERALLY AND THE
NECESSITY OF STATE COURT REVIEW IN PARTICULAR IN COMMERCE
CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO CORPORATE WELFARE.

A long-standing principle of North Carolina law holds that "[aill
power which is not expressly limited by the people in our State
Constitution remains with the people, and an act of the people through
their representatives in the legislature is valid unless prohibited by that
Constitution."1 6 While it is true that the legislature serves "as the
lawmaking agent of the people,"" this affirmation of the legislature's
responsibility is consistently coupled with the mandate that no law is
valid if inconsistent with North Carolina's state constitution. 8 In fact,
the judiciary has the power and the duty to declare a legislative act
unconstitutional when such is "plainly and clearly the case.""
In determining whether an act of the legislature is valid under the
state constitution, North Carolina law has firmly established that "issues
concerning the proper construction and application of North Carolina
laws and the Constitution of North Carolina can only be answered with

14. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 154 S.E. 838 (N.C. 1930) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. at 841.
16. State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (N.C. 1989) (citing McIntyre
v. Clarkson, 119 S.E.2d 888, 891 (N.C. 1961)).
17. Id. at 478; see also S. Auto Fin. Co. v. Pittman, 117 S.E.2d 423, 425 (N.C. 1960)
("We have neither the power nor the desire to usurp [the legislature's] power.").
18. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 102 S.E.2d 853, 861 (N.C.
1958).
19. Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 360 S.E.2d 756, 761 (N.C. 1987) (quoting Glenn
v. Bd. of Educ., 187 S.E. 781, 784 (N.C. 1936) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Kornegay v. City of Goldsboro, 105 S.E. 187, 189 (N.C. 1920) (discussing the scope
of judicial review of legislative acts).
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finality by [the North Carolina Supreme Court].i"20 In a brief review of
North Carolina's history of state constitutional jurisprudence, the court
noted the immemorial significance of the doctrine of judicial review:
Prior to the creation of the United States of America by the ratification of
the Constitution of the United States, North Carolina courts applied the
doctrine of judicial review to strike down a legislative act as contrary to
the Constitution of North Carolina. Thus, approximately sixteen years
before Marbury v. Madison, . . . North Carolina's courts were among the
first to recognize the doctrine of judicial review.2 1
Further emphasizing this crucial role of the judiciary, the court
stated in Moore v. Knightdale Board of Elections:2
[1]t is not only within the power, but ... it is the duty, of the courts in
proper cases to declare an act of the Legislature unconstitutional, and
this obligation arises from the duty imposed upon the courts to declare
what the law is.
The Constitution is the supreme law. It is ordained and established by
the people, and all judges are sworn to support it. When the
constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly is questioned, the
courts place the act by the side of the Constitution, with the purpose and
the desire to uphold it if it can be reasonably done, but under the
obligation, if there is an irreconcilable conflict, to sustain the will of the
people as expressed in the Constitution, and not the will of the
legislators, who are but agents of the people. 23
To determine whether an act of the General Assembly conflicts with
the Constitution, the court is typically guided by the following principle:
"Every presumption favors the validity of a statute. It will not be
declared invalid unless its unconstitutionality be determined beyond
reasonable doubt."24 Notwithstanding the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard that is typically applied, "[tihe presumption of constitutionality
is not .

.

25
. and should not be, conclusive."

20. Martin, 385 S.E.2d at 479 (citing State v. Arrington, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (N.C.
1984)).

21. Id. at 478 (internal citations omitted).
22. Moore v. Knightdale Bd. of Elections, 413 S.E.2d 541 (N.C. 1992).
23. Id. at 543 (citing State v. Knight, 85 S.E. 418, 427 (N.C. 1915)).

24. Baker v. Martin, 410 S.E.2d 887, 889 (N.C. 1991) (quoting Gardner v. Reidsville,
153 S.E.2d 139, 150 (N.C. 1967)).
25. Moore, 413 S.E.2d at 543.
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The inconclusive nature of the "presumption of constitutionality" of
a legislative act,26 was highlighted by Corum v. University of North
27
Carolina,
in which the court stated:
It is the state judiciary that has the responsibility to protect the state
constitutional rights of the citizens; this obligation . . . is as old as the

State. Our Constitution is more detailed and specific than the federal
Constitution in the protection of the rights of its citizens. We give our
Constitution a liberal interpretation in favor of its citizens with respect

to those provisions which were designed to safeguard the liberty and
security of the citizens in regard to both person and property.28
Thus, applying a modest form of judicial review to all legislative
acts and casting litigation over economic incentive litigation as a policy
debate rather than a legal debate, as suggested by the court of appeals in
at least one appeal of an incentives lawsuit,29 would contradict the
supreme court's prior precedent.
Instead, the supreme court has
articulated that courts possess a clearly established duty to "ascertain and
declare the intent of the framers of the Constitution and to reject any
legislative act which is in conflict therewith." 0
A series of cases has addressed arguments that an "irreconcilable
conflict"" exists between North Carolina's incentives schemes and the
state constitution, though just one has raised federal constitutional
questions." Standing of the plaintiffs in each case has presented a first,
and at times insurmountable, hurdle for the taxpayers attacking the state
and federal constitutionality of incentives packages." Far from being an
issue of policy better left to the legislature, as propounded by at least two
academics," the constitutionality, as contradistinguished from the
wisdom or folly, of corporate incentives is appropriate for judicial
26. See id.
27. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992).
28. Id. at 290 (internal citations omitted).
29. See Blinson v. State, 651 S.E.2d 268, 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) ("To the extent
plaintiffs question the wisdom of the incentives and whether they will in fact provide the
public benefit promised, they have sought relief in the wrong forum.").
30. Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 159 S.E.2d 745, 750 (N.C. 1968).
31. Moore, 413 S.E.2d at 543 (citing State v. Knight, 85 S.E. 418, 427 (N.C. 1915)).
32. See Blinson, 651 S.E.2d at 273. But see, Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467
S.E.2d 615, 626-27 (N.C. 1996) (standing not discussed).
33. Blinson, 651 S.E.2d at 274 (holding plaintiffs lacked standing as taxpayers to
raise claims under the Dormant Commerce Clause).
34. Jennifer Carr & Cara Griffith, Can North Carolina Constitutionally Subsidize
Google?, 45 STATE TAX NOTEs 585 (2007) ("In the end, it might be nice to get the court's
take on the constitutionality of tax incentives, but that is an issue that is better addressed
by the legislature.").
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review.3 ' As set forth below, the General Assembly "exceed[ed] its
limitations"36 in at least one high profile corporate welfare package.3 7
The people's right to constitutional governance has been infringed upon;
it is imperative, therefore, for the judiciary to exercise its duty to declare
economic development incentives unconstitutional, notwithstanding
their popularity.38
11.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE PROHIBITS CORPORATE WELFARE IN THE
FORM OF TARGETED TAX INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE WELFARE.

At the outset, it should be noted that this Article does not dispute

that North Carolina, like any other state, may "try to attract business by
creating an environment conducive to economic activity, as by
maintaining good roads, sound public education, or low taxes," 39 and
may even

"enact laws ...

that have the purpose

and

effect of

However, noble intentions do not
encouraging domestic industry."'
warrant ignoble means, permissible ends do not dissolve constitutional
constraints, and North Carolina's economic development efforts are not
unfettered by the Commerce Clause."
A. Considerationof the HistoricalContext of the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause is the affirmative constitutional grant of
power to congress to regulate commerce: "The Congress shall have
Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."" The Commerce Clause was
born of "destructive trade wars among the states[,] a major problem

35. See generally Morgan L. Holcomb & Nicholas Allen Smith, The Post-Cuno
Litigation Landscape, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1157 (2008) (discussing incentives lawsuits
and standing in state and federal courts).
36. See State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 866 (N.C. 1940) (holding a discriminatory
licensing scheme unconstitutional).
37. See infra notes 83-111 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.
38. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 634 (N.C. 1996) (Orr, J.,
dissenting) ("While economic times have changed and will continue to change, the
philosophy that constitutional interpretation and application are subject to the whims of
everybody's doing it' cannot be sustained.").
39. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994).
40. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
42. Id.
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under the Articles of Confederation." 4 3 Competition among the states in
the taxation arena was instrumental in development of the Commerce
Clause.'
Taxation-and state tax competition-was instrumental in
the inclusion of the Commerce Clause in the Constitution. Alexander
Hamilton asked, for example, "Would Connecticut and New Jersey long
4
submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit?"a
If Congress has not legislated in an area of commerce, courts may
nevertheless enforce the anti-protectionism purpose behind the
Commerce Clause by striking down discriminatory state legislation
through the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, which has been
described thusly:
[T]he Constitution's express grant to Congress of the power to regulate
Commerce .. . among the several States contains a further negative
command, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, that create [s] an
area of trade free from interference by the States. This negative command

prevents a State from jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole
by plac[ing] burdens on the flow of commerce across its borders that

commerce wholly within those borders would not bear.

6

While the goal of the Commerce Clause is to prevent the kind of
"economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies
and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation," 7 a State
may enact legislation with "the purpose and effect of encouraging
domestic industry."" The United States Supreme Court has consistently
held that the "Commerce Clause stands as a limitation on the means by
which a State can constitutionally seek to achieve that goal."4 9
43. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 245 (15th ed.
2004).
44. See Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate
Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 Ky. LJ. 37,
60-66 (2005) (describing discrimination by seven states under the Articles of
Confederation).
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
46. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
47. Hughles v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979); see also Granholm v. Heald,
544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005).
48. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984).
49. Id.; see, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); New Energy
Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279-80 (1988) (striking down an Ohio credit
against the state's motor fuel tax for each gallon of ethanol sold provided the ethanol was
made in Ohio or another state with a similar tax credit); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v.
Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 407 (1984) (invalidating New York corporate income tax credit
measured by the share of a company's exporting business conducted from New York);
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Specifically, the Supreme Court has stated:
[nlo State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may impose a tax
which discriminates against interstate commerce . . . by providing a

direct commercial advantage to local business. The prohibition against
discriminatory treatment of interstate commerce follows inexorably from
the basic purpose of the Clause. Permitting the individual States to
enact laws that favor local enterprises at the expense of out-of-state
businesses would invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas
destructive of the free trade which the Clause protects.50

B.

Modern Scope of the Commerce Clause

"This 'negative' aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic
protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state
economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors."" While the
United States Supreme Court's approach to determining the limit that
the Dormant Commerce Clause has on state power has varied, there are
"some firm peaks of decision which remain unquestioned."" "Among
these is the fundamental principle that . . . [n]o State, consistent with

the Commerce Clause, may 'impose a tax which discriminates against
interstate commerce .

.

. by providing a direct commercial advantage to

local business.' 5 3
When a tax is discriminatory on its face, it is virtually per se
unconstitutional." The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
"'discrimination' simply means differential treatment of in-state and outof-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the

Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981) (invalidating "First Use" tax imposed
on certain uses of natural gas brought into the state); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S.
325 (1976); RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Fin., 169 Misc. 2d 674,
688 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional portions of New York Administrative Code
allowing accelerated depreciation deductions for in-state property only).
50. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'r, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
51. New Energy Co. of Ind., 486 U.S. at 273.
52. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 329 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
53. Id.; see also Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 268 (discussing nondiscrimination
as the "cardinal rule of Commerce Clause jurisprudence [I").
54. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., 466 U.S. at 407 (explaining that for a facially
discriminatory tax, "the Court 'need not know how unequal the [t]ax is before
concluding that it unconstitutionally discriminates' (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. at 760)).
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latter." If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per
se invalid."5 6
In determining whether discrimination exists, the United States
Supreme Court has focused on the substance and not the form. Justice
White explained:
Virtually every discriminatory statute allocates benefits or burdens
unequally; each can be viewed as conferring a benefit on one party and a
detriment on the other, in either an absolute or relative sense. The
determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one
focuses upon the benefited or the burdened party.

. .

. Consequently it is

irrelevant to the Commerce Clause inquiry that the motivation of the
legislature was the desire to aid the makers of the locally produced
beverage rather than to harm out-of-state producers.58
The clearest and most consistent example of the kind of
discriminatory tax provision that is barred by the Commerce Clause is a
tariff, i.e., a tax that is imposed only on those sellers of a product who
manufacture the product out-of-state, and not on their competitors who
manufacture in-state. 59 The credits typically included in incentives
packages offered by states are the functional equivalent of a tariff."
C.

North Carolina'sCommerce Clause Indifference

North Carolina's corporate income and franchise taxes apply to
businesses that manufacture either inside or outside of the state, so long
as they engage in sufficient activities in North Carolina to subject them
55. Id.
56. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
57. Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 273 (dismissing Hawaii's defense that the tax
exemptions should be permitted because the legislature's intent was to benefit local
industry and not to burden out-of-state parties).
58. Id.
59. W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 193 ("The paradigmatic example of a law
discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective tariff or customs duty, which
taxes goods imported from other States, but does not tax similar products produced in
State."); see also Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 465-66 (2005) (holding that
Michigan and New York statutes with the "object and design" of granting in-state
wineries a "competitive advantage" over out-of-state competitors violated the Commerce
Clause).
60. See generally Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints
on State Business Development Incentives, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 789, 853-54 (1996)
("Perhaps most important, funneling money to existing in-state firms already engaged in
economic battle with out-of-state competitors involves, in a rather pure sense, the sort of
'economic protectionism' at which the Commerce Clause takes aim.").
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to the state's taxing jurisdiction."1 One notable incentives package from
the State of North Carolina effectively excused qualifying computer
manufacturers who located their manufacturing activity in North
Carolina by allowing them to substantially reduce, and indeed to entirely
avoid, such tax liability.12 This incentives deal was crafted for the benefit
of Dell, Inc. and was the subject of a legal assault by seven individual
taxpayers raising Commerce Clause claims as well as state constitutional
claims." In this case, the plaintiffs argued and the court of appeals did
not disagree that the result was a system that granted a "direct
commercial advantage" to those businesses that choose to manufacture
in-state, by freeing them from the North Carolina tax burden that is
faced by their competitors who manufacture their products elsewhere.64
The constitutional flaws with tax incentives targeted for a specific
beneficiary locating within the state are revealed by analyzing the Dell
giveaway. In 2005, during a special session of the General Assembly, the
state created tax credits in the form of amendments to an existing
incentives scheme, the Bill Lee Act," as well as a new tax credit known
as the New Tax Credit. 66 Both the Bill Lee Act amendments6 ' and the

61. "The incidence of the tax on a foreign corporation is that part of its net income
earned within North Carolina by reason of its interstate business, and reasonably
attributable to its interstate business done or performable within the borders of North
Carolina, and not upon its franchise to engage in interstate business in North Carolina."
ET & WNC Transp. Co. v. Currie, 104 S.E.2d 403, 409 (N.C. 1958) (construing section
105-134 of the North Carolina General Statutes prior to its amendment in 1964).
62. Blinson v. State, 651 S.E.2d 268, 271-72 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (summarizing the
2004 Session Laws of North Carolina).
63. Id. at 271-73.
64. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 34, Blinson, 651 S.E.2d at 268 (N.C. Ct. App.
2007) (No. COA 06-1258); Blinson, 268 S.E.2d at 274 ("[Pllaintiffs' claims under these
provisions pertain only to a theoretical injury that might be suffered by other businesses
that may attempt to compete with Dell . . . .").
65. The Bill Lee Act was first adopted in 1996 for the purported purpose of
encouraging investment in economically distressed areas of the State. 1996 N.C. Sess.
Laws 13. Article 3A, the Bill Lee Act, was repealed on January 1, 2007. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
105-129.2A(a) (repealed 2007). It was replaced with article 3J, the Replacement of Bill
Lee Act ("Replacement Act"). Id. §§ 105-129.80 to .89 (2010). The Replacement Act
streamlined and continued many of the credits for industries eligible under the Bill Lee
Act, including technology companies. The new law went into effect on January 1, 2007,
and contains a sunset provision throughJanuary 1, 2011. Id. § 105-129.82(a).
66. 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 204, § 1 (extra session).
67. 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 204, § 2 (extra session).
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New Tax Credit6 8 were applicable against North Carolina's corporate
income69 an/or franchise tax.
1. North Carolina'sTax Scheme and Dell's Special Deal
North Carolina's corporate income and franchise taxes, like those in
other states, are based upon the corporations' net income apportioned to
the business activity attributable to North Carolina." The taxes derived
from income earned through the interstate activity of corporations that
engage in interstate commerce, so long as the taxed activity has a
"substantial nexus" within North Carolina.n Specifically, the corporate
income tax, against which the New Tax Credit and the Bill Lee Act
Amendments may be applied, is a percentage of net income attributable
to North Carolina by every C corporation doing business in this state."
Corporate income is apportioned to the state using three factors: the
taxpayers' (1) property, (2) payroll, and (3) sales, located in North
Carolina." When determining the apportioned amount, North Carolina
doubles the value of the sales factor.' Thus, North Carolina taxes the
income of a corporation in large part based on where its customers are,
as opposed to where the corporation's production activities are located.
Similarly, North Carolina's corporate franchise tax, against which
the New Tax Credit and the Bill Lee Act amendments apply, is calculated
by the same apportionment formula and is not based on whether the
corporation is organized in North Carolina.'6 Franchise taxes are
imposed on any corporation "doing business" in this state, for the
privilege of "doing business" in this state." "The franchise tax amounts
to one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) per one thousand dollars ($1,000) of
the total amount of capital stock, surplus and undivided profits."' Like
the corporate income tax, if the corporation is conducting business in
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. H§ 105-129.60 to .66 (repealedJuly 1, 2010).
69. Id. § 105-130.3 (2010) ("A tax is imposed on the State net income of every C
Corporation doing business in this State.").
70. Id. § 105-122(a) ("An annual franchise or privilege tax is imposed on a
corporation doing business in this State.").
71. Id. §105-122(cl).
72. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.3.
74. Id. § 105-130.4(i).
75. Id.
76. Id. §105-122(cl).
77. Id. §105-122(a), (d) (implementing franchise or privilege tax on domestic and
foreign corporations).
78. Id. §105-122(d).
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several states, it apportions the amount subject to franchise tax
according to the same apportionment formula used in determining the
income tax, again with the doubling of the sales factor.79 The New Tax
Credit against both corporate income and franchise taxes applies only to
a corporation with a manufacturing facility located within the state."o So
while the corporate income" and franchise taxes" reach interstate
activity, the credit is only available to those corporations with an in-state
facility.8 3
2.

The Federal ConstitutionalFlaw with North Carolina'sPractice

By reducing tax liability of taxpayers only if they choose to increase
their in-state investment or activities, North Carolina gives an advantage
In
to in-state businesses and "forecloses tax-neutral decisions.*
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, New York included "Domestic
International Sales Corporation" (DISC) income in a corporation's
income tax liability.8 5 To encourage corporations with New York DISC
income to locate additional exporting business in the state, New York
offered a corporate income tax credit that was proportionate to the
percentage of a corporation's exporting business conducted in New
York.86 The Supreme Court saw no substantive difference between New
York's protectionist scheme and those struck down in Maryland v.
Louisiana7 and Boston Stock Exchange.8 " En route to declaring New
York's statute unconstitutional, the Westinghouse court focused on the
economic substance in determining that the several formal distinctions
were "irrelevant."8 9 The first distinction that the court found irrelevant
was premised upon the nature of the tax involved: both Maryland v.
Louisiana and Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commissioner involved
transactional taxes, while the Westinghouse court considered a franchise

79. Id. §105-122(cl).
80. As noted previously, the "major computer manufacturer" also has to meet certain
Additionally, the unit output is a factor in
investment and hiring thresholds.
determining the annual credit. Id. §105-129.62(a) (repealed July 1, 2010).
81. Id. § 105-130.3 (2010).
82. Id. § 105-122(b).
83. Id. § 105-129.62(a) (repealedJuly 1, 2010).
84. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 406 (1984).
85. Id. at 392.
86. Id. at 393.
87. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
88. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'r, 4 29 U.S. 318 (1997).
89. Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 404.
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tax.90 Underscoring the Court's rejection of formalistic distinctions,
Justice Blackmun for the majority admonished: "It cannot be that a State
can circumvent the prohibition of the Commerce Clause against placing
burdensome taxes on out-of-state transactions by burdening those
transactions with a tax that is levied in the aggregate-as is the franchise
tax-rather than on individual transaction."9 '
Importantly, a second distinction found irrelevant by the court was
the nominal distinction between disallowing a tax credit, on the one
hand, and imposing a tax on the other:
New York discriminateld] against business carried on outside the State
by disallowing a tax credit rather than by imposing a higher tax. The
discriminatory economic effect of these two measures would be
identical. New York allows a 70% credit against tax liability for all
This provision is
shipments made from within the State.
indistinguishable from one that would apply to New York shipments a
tax rate that is 30% of that applied to shipments from other States. We
have declined to attach any constitutional significance to such formal
distinctions that lack economic substance. See e.g., Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756 (1981) (tax scheme imposing tax at
uniform rate on in-state and out-of-state sales held to be
unconstitutional because discrimination against interstate commerce was
'the necessary result of various tax credits and exclusions' that benefited
only in-state consumers of gas).92
Finally, the Court found it irrelevant whether the tax focused on
diverting new business into the state or preventing current business
from leaving, holding that the tax was a "discriminatory tax that
'forecloses tax-neutral decisions and . . . create[d] . . . an advantage' for

firms operating in New York by placing 'a discriminatory burden on
commerce to its sister States."'93
"[A] tax upon the industry that is nondiscriminatory in its
assessment, but that has an 'exemption' or 'credit' for in-state members
... is no different in principle from a [directly discriminatory tax], and
has likewise been held invalid."94 The New Tax Credit upheld in Blinson
provided Dell with an opportunity to eliminate 100% of its corporate
income and franchise tax liability,95 plus collect additional credit

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 404-05 (footnotes omitted).
93. Id. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 331).
94. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1984) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (internal citations omitted).
95. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-129.64(b) (repealedJuly 1, 2010).
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amounts that could have been carried forward for 25 years in connection
with its in-state activity. 96 As in the case of Westinghouse, although the
franchise and income taxes may be neutral, the New Tax Credit facially
discriminates in favor of a company that builds a manufacturing facility
in-state 97 and thereby "forecloses tax-neutral decisions" in violation of
the Commerce Clause.98
The New Tax Credit benefits a corporation with North Carolina
corporate income and/or franchise tax liability by lowering and likely
eliminating that tax liability when the company invests in property in
the state. 99 Conversely, for corporations with corporate income and
franchise tax liability in North Carolina that choose to invest in
manufacturing facilities out-of-state, the North Carolina corporate
income and franchise tax acts as discriminatorily as does a tariff by
providing a benefit to domestic manufacturers not eligible for the New
Tax Credit, the eligibility for which is dependant upon the presence of
manufacturing facilities in North Carolina.100 Such "discriminatory
taxation of out-of-state manufacturers" runs afoul of the Commerce
Clause."' 0 The discrimination here works precisely the same effect as a
tariff in that it promotes domestic activity, here manufacturing, at the
expense of foreign manufacturing. 0 2 It is the retention of the corporate
income tax and franchise tax liability for choosing to invest outside of
North Carolina that burdens the company by effectively extracting larger
tax revenues from those computer manufacturers and business locating
beyond North Carolina's borders, thereby effectively acting as a tariff.103
For example, Company A and Company B each sell equal numbers
of computers in North Carolina annually, but currently have no in-state
manufacturing facility. The income tax liability for both companies is
96. See id. § 105-129.64(d) (repealedJuly 1, 2010).
97. See generally supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
98. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 331.
99. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-129.64 (repealed July 1, 2010).
100. See id. § 105-129.62(a) (repealedJuly 1, 2010).
101. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
102. See, e.g., id. at 273; Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 266 (1984);
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1984). In some cases, the
challenged benefit does not go directly to a domestic competitor, but to a competing
product or a competitor's customers. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 267;
Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 319-20.
103. See, e.g., Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1984); Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1981); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437
U.S. 267, 276 (1978); cf. Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 643-45 (1994)
(invalidating tax on all goods imported into the state to the extent that tax exceeded sales
tax revenues for which the tax was intended to "compensate").
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the same in North Carolina. If Company A makes the required
investments, hiring, etc. in a manufacturing facility as outlined in the
Dell legislation, then Company A's franchise and corporate income tax
liability will be eliminated. The burden on Company B is greater, and
Company A receives a "direct commercial advantage" relative to
Company B.1 o4
The Bill Lee Act amendments violate the Commerce Clause in
exactly the same way as the New Tax Credit explained above.o' The Bill
Lee Act generally provides tax credits against income taxes, franchise
taxes and gross premiums taxes for new and expanding business in
North Carolina.o 6 These are credits based on new jobs created in the
state, investment in machinery and equipment in the state, investment in
technology, research and development, worker training, substantial
investment in other property and development zone projects.10' As
previously discussed, tax incentives credits often require a threshold
investment, including the credit for investing in machinery and
09
equipment,1os or satisfaction of minimum employment standards,1 and
the value of the credit is usually measured by the location where the
business is expanding." 0 However, as noted previously, for companies
like Dell that qualify for the New Tax Credit, most of these thresholds
and tier requirements are waived by the Bill Lee Act amendments."' By
offering credits for in-state business investment only, the Bill Lee Act
amendments, like the New Tax Credit, provide "differential
treatment . . . that benefits [in-state activity] and burdens [out- of-state

The New Tax Credits and the Bill Lee Act amendments
activity].
treat in-state and out-of-state economic activities differently, benefiting
the former and burdening the latter.

104. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 329; see also cases cited supra note 102.
105. See cases cited supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-129.1 to .13 (2010) (indicating that The Bill Lee Act has
been repealed for business activities occurring after January 1, 2007).
107. Id. §§ 105-129.1 to .13.
108. Id. § 105-129.
109. Id. § 105-129.8.
110. Id. §§ 105-129.1 to .13.
111. Id. § 105-129.4(b7).
112. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
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D. Cuno: Unconstitutionalityof CorporateWelfare Schemes Recognized
The tax credits at issue in Blinson are similar in both form and
substance to those at issue in Cuno v. DaimlerChryslerCorp.,113 a case out
of the Sixth Circuit ultimately dismissed by the United States Supreme
Court for lack of standing."' Cuno involved local and state incentives
used by Ohio and the City of Toledo to induce DaimlerChrysler to
The local incentive
expand its Jeep assembly plant in Toledo."'
provided DaimlerChrysler with a ten year property tax exemption,
conditioned on DaimlerChrysler's agreement to meet investment and
hiring requirements.116 The other incentive was an investment tax credit
(ITC) against Ohio's corporate franchise tax and corporate income tax,
determined by an apportionment formula."1 ' The ITC reduced the
corporate franchise and income tax based on the amount of investment
in machinery and equipment installed in Ohio.118 The ITC is similar in
form to North Carolina's Bill Lee Credits.'
The Sixth Circuit held that
Ohio, by granting tax credits to businesses that are subject to Ohio's
franchise tax if they locate new economic activity at sites in Ohio while
denying the credits to identically situated businesses that locate new
activity out of state, was discriminating in favor of in-state economic
activity.120 Consequently, the Sixth Circuit held that the ITC violated
the Commerce Clause.12 1 In contrast, the court held that the property
tax exemption did not unconstitutionally discriminate against out of
state commerce.122 While the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs in
Cuno lacked standing under the stringent standing requirements
imposed by the United States Constitution, 1 23 the reasoning of the Sixth
Circuit is nonetheless persuasive.124 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's
standing decision in Cuno underscores the importance of state court

113. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated in part
and remanded, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
114. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 354 (2006).
115. Id. at 337; Cuno, 386 F.3d at 741.
116. Cuno, 386 F.3d at 741-42.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 741.
119. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. H§ 105-129.2 (2010).
120. Cuno, 386 F.3d at 746.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 747.
123. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006).
124. Cuno, 386 F.3d at 746.
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review of Commerce Clause claimsl25 where, as in North Carolina,
courts are historically more welcoming to taxpayer lawsuits and not
encumbered by the federal constitutional requirement of a "case or
controversy." 2 6 State court challenges are not new' 7 and have been met

with some success.12 8
E.

ConstitutionalMeans for PromotingEconomic Development

As noted at the outset, the Commerce Clause does not prevent
states from encouraging economic activity. 2 9 However, as discussed at
length above, 30 the United States Supreme Court has made clear that in
exercising the right to encourage economic activity, States may not
utilize measures that discriminate between in-state and out-of-state
13
activity.m

125. Paul V. McCord, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the MBT Credit and Incentive
Scheme: You Can't Get There From Here, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1431, 1478, n. 289-94 (2007).
126. Goldston v. State, 637 S.E.2d 876, 882 (2006) ("[T]he nuts and bolts of North
Carolina standing doctrine are not coincident with federal standing doctrine.").
127. See, e.g., Brady v. City of Dubuque, 495 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1993); Hawkins v.
City of Greenfield, 230 N.E.2d 396 (Ind. 1967).
128. See Dolores W. Gregory, Worksheet BNA Interview: Sixth Circuit Decision in Cuno
Raises Questions That Congress May be Called Upon to Answer in 2005, TM STATE REPORT
No. 1470 WS 10 (BNA) (2006).
129. See cases cited supra notes 38-39, 47 and accompanying text.
130. See cases cited supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999) (invalidating
Alabama franchise tax that allowed domestic corporations to calculate the tax on a more
favorable base than out-of-state corporations); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (invalidating Maine property tax exemption restricted to
organizations primarily serving in-state residents); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S.
325 (1996) (invalidating North Carolina intangibles tax which reduced the taxable value
of corporate stock depending on the percentage of a corporation's business conducted in
the state); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994)
(invalidating Oregon statute imposing additional charges on solid waste generated out of
state and brought into Oregon for disposal); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269 (1988)
(invalidating Ohio fuel tax credit restricted to in-state ethanol
producers and producers from states granting reciprocal tax advantages to Ohio
producers); Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984) (invalidating West Virginia's
wholesalers' gross receipts tax which exempted local manufacturers who were subject to
manufacturer's tax); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (invalidating
Louisiana's natural gas tax whose credits and exemptions effectively sheltered in-state
users from the burden of the tax); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'r, 429 U.S. 318
(1977) (invalidating provisions of New York securities transfer tax granting preferential
rates to in-state sales).
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Proponents of incentives like those in the New Tax Credit and the
Bill Lee Act amendments argue that such tax credits do not discriminate
since they are available to in-state and out-of-state corporations. 132 But,
this argument misses the point that the relevant discrimination here is
between companies that do and do not ultimately become North
Carolina manufacturers, not between those companies who could locate
in North Carolina.
Tax credit proponents also argue that the Commerce Clause does
not prohibit "subsidies" and use that term to encompass the whole of
economic incentives provided by states. Contrary to those arguments,
however, it remains an open question as to the validity of subsidies
under the Commerce Clause.13 3 Even so, the supreme court has sharply
differentiated between "direct" subsidies and tax incentives.'
Ill. CORPORATE WELFARE VIOLATES THE PUBLIC PURPOSE CLAUSES OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION.

The North Carolina Constitution limits the government's right to
impose taxes "for public purposes" 35 and also limits the power of the
government to contract with and appropriate money to private entities
"for the accomplishment of public purposes only."'3 1 Collectively, these
provisions are the basis of what has become North Carolina's "public
purpose doctrine."3 m Longstanding principles of law as set out below
forcefully condemn the use of public moneys to benefit private entities
and set forth a two-part test to evaluate whether expenditures are
ultimately constitutionally permissible.
A. Maready is not a Blanket Authorizationfor CorporateWelfare
In addressing the issue of whether incentives packages violate
article V, section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution, specifically
132. Brief of Defendant-Appellee Dell at 32, Blinson v. State, 651 S.E.2d 268 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2007) (No. COA 06-1258).
133. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994) ("We have
never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies, and we need not do so now.
We have, however, noted that 'direct subsidization of domestic industry does not
ordinarily run afoul' of the negative Commerce Clause." (quoting New Energy, 486 U.S.
at 278)).
134. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 588-91 (citing New Energy, 486 U.S.
269).
135. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1).
136. Id. art. V, § 2(7).
137. Blinson v. State, 651 S.E.2d 268, 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
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the "public purpose" clause, the threshold question to be resolved is how
broadly or narrowly the case of Maready v. City of Winston-Salem"s
should be interpreted. Taken to its logical conclusion, Maready,
according to at least one lower court, 3 1 stands for the proposition that as
long as the expenditure of public tax dollars is "aimed" at economic
development, then the "public purpose" test has been met. However, a
careful analysis of Maready reveals its holding is much more narrow.'4
1. Maready holds that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1 is constitutional.14 1
In Maready, the trial court entered four conclusions of law, only
one of which is pertinent here. It is: "North Carolina General Statute
§158-7.1 is unconstitutional in that it allows the expenditure of public
funds for private purposes in violation of the North Carolina
Constitution. "142
The State's brief to the North Carolina Supreme Court in Maready
contained only two "questions presented," again, only one of which
applies to the discussion here: "Did the Trial Court commit error in
holding that N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 impermissibly allows the expenditure of

138. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 615 (N.C. 1996).
139. Blinson, 651 S.E.2d at 273.
140. See id.; infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
141. In examining the import and scope of section 158-7.1 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, it is important to note that it begins with a general authorization: "(a)
to make appropriations for the purposes of aiding and encouraging the location of
manufacturing enterprises, making industrial surveys and locating industrial and
commercial plants in or near such a city or county . . . which in the discretion of the
governing body of the city or of the county commissioners of the county, will increase
the population, taxable property, agricultural industries and business prospects of any
city or county." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1 (2010). Next under section 158-7.1(b), the
statute sets out "specific economic development activities" but notes that the list does not
limit, by implication or otherwise, the broader grant of authority. Id. § 158-7.1(b). The
"specific" undertakings are, however, very general. For example, a county or city "may
acquire and develop land"; "may acquire, assemble, and hold for resale property that is
suitable for industrial or commercial use"; "may acquire, construct, convey, or lease a
building suitable for industrial or commercial use"; "may construct, extend or own utility
facilities"; "may extend or may provide ... water and sewer lines"; or "may engage in site
preparation for industrial properties or facilities." Id. The specific undertakings and the
general grant in subsection (a) must both still be authorized and, if authorized by section
158-7.1, be determined as to whether they are constitutional as applied. See id. § 1587.1(a).
142. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Judgment, Maready v. City of WinstonSalem, No. 95 CVS 623 (N.C. Super. Ct., Forsyth County Aug. 28, 1995).
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public funds for private purposes in violation of the North Carolina
Constitution?" 4 3
In light of the question presented, the supreme court majority
opinion written by Justice Whichard states: "We therefore hold that
N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 which permits the expenditure of public moneys for
economic development incentive programs does not violate the public
purpose clause of the North Carolina Constitution."14 4 Therefore,
Maready stands only for the single principle that section 158-7.1 of the
North Carolina General Statutes is facially constitutional. 4 5 At no time
does the case specifically detail the incentives in question, except in the
dissent. 146
In addition, the holding in Maready applies only to a single
statute-section 158-7.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes.
Frequently, mega-sized incentives packages result from special
legislation."' These packages are based on independent and separate
legislation, the validity of which is not determined by resort to the
Maready court's core holding, but should be analyzed independently
under the Public Purpose Clause.
Although courts are bound by the holding in Maready establishing
that the expenditure by local government of public money for economic
development programs pursuant to section 158-7.1 may be for a public
purpose, courts must nevertheless make an independent determination
of the constitutionality of specific incentives packages authorized by

143. Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant State of North Carolina's Brief at 1, Maready,
467 S.E.2d 615 (No. 422 PA 95).
144. Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 627.
145. See Wisc. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 546 U.S. 410, 412 (2006)
(per curiam) (upholding legislation against a facial challenge, but not "purport[ing] to
resolve future as-applied challenges").
146. Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 634 (Orr, J., dissenting).
147. See Job Maintenance and Capital Development Fund, ch. 143B, 2007 N.C. Sess.
Laws 552 (special legislation for Goodyear Tire & Rubber and Bridgestone/Firestone);
2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 204 (special legislation for Dell) [hereinafter Dell Legislation]; see
also 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 66 (special legislation for Google, Inc.); 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws
284 (appropriation for Johnson and Wales University, a private culinary school); 2005
N.C. Sess. Laws 276 (another appropriation for Johnson and Wales University, a private
culinary school); 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 66 (one more appropriation for Johnson and
Wales University, a private culinary school); 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 323 (appropriation
for Johnson and Wales University, a private culinary school, again); 2008 N.C. Sess.
Laws 107 (still another appropriation for Johnson and Wales University, a private
culinary school); Jonathan B. Cox & Lynn Bonner, Tire Makers Win State Incentives: A
New Law that Broadens the Scope of Industrial Policy Makes Way for as Much as $60
Million to Improve N.C. Facilities,RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Sept. 12, 2007.
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separate legislation. In making this determination, these courts must
utilize the test in Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton,148 just as
Maready utilized that test to evaluate section 158-7.1.1'4
In Madison Cablevision,Justice Meyer writing for a unanimous court
quoted with approval a review of how the court had addressed the
question of what constitutes a public purpose, noting that "[olur reports
contain extensive philosophizing . . . on the subject."o5 0 Justice Meyer
continued by stating public purpose jurisprudence is "best summarized
in the 1970 opinion of the supreme court by Chief Justice Bobbitt:
A slide-rule definition to determine public purpose for all time cannot be
formulated; the concept expands with the population, economy,
scientific knowledge, and changing conditions. As people are brought
closer together in congested areas, the public welfare requires
governmental operation of facilities which were once considered
exclusively private enterprises, and necessitates the expenditure of tax
funds for purposes which, in an earlier day, were not classified as public.
Often public and private interests are so co-mingled that it is difficult to
determine which predominates. It is clear, however, that for a use to be
public its benefits must be in common and not for particular persons,
interests, or estates; the ultimate net gain or advantage must be the
public's as contradistinguished from that of an individual or private
entity. 151

Justice Meyer then set out the test which is still applicable today:
Two guiding principles have been established for determining that a
particular undertaking by a municipality is for a public purpose: (1) it
involves a reasonable connection with the convenience and necessity of
the particular municipality, Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36
S.E.2d 803 (1946); and (2) the activity benefits the public generally, as
opposed to special interests or persons, Martin v. Housing Corp., 277
N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665. This has been our traditional test, and we
continue to adhere to it.'1 2
Application of Madison Cablevision is wholly consistent with
Maready where the majority not only acknowledged the two-part test in
Madison Cablevision, but also utilized that test in resolving the issue
before the court. As to the first prong of the test, the Maready majority
stated:
148. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 386 S.E.2d 200 (N.C. 1989).
149. Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 624-26.
150. Madison Cablevision, 386 S.E.2d at 207.
151. Id. (quoting Martin v. Housing Corp., 175 S.E.2d 665, 672-73 (N.C. 1970))
(internal citations omitted).
152. Id.
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[Wihether an activity is within the appropriate scope of governmental
involvement and is reasonably related to communal needs may be
evaluated by determining how similar the activity is to others which this
Court has held to be within the permissible realm of governmental
action. We conclude that the activities N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 authorizes are
in keeping with those accepted as within the scope of permissible
3
governmental action.1 5
As to the second prong of the Madison Cablevision test, the Maready
court states: "[U]nder the expanded understanding of public purpose,
even the most innovative activities N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 permits are

constitutional so long as they primarily benefit the public and not a private
5
The majority, however, answered the question posed by the
party."'1
second prong of Madison Cablevision by concluding:
The public advantages are not indirect, remote, or incidental; rather,
they are directly aimed at furthering the general economic welfare of the
people of the communities affected. While private actors will necessarily
benefit from the expenditures authorized, such benefit is merely

incidental."'
Thus the second prong, answered in the context of statute, deemed

section 158-7.1 constitutional.
In the most recent North Carolina Supreme Court case to address
this area of the law, Piedmont Triad Airport Authority v. Urbine,'5 6 Justice
Butterfield, writing for a unanimous court, stated:
As we stated in Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, this Court is no
stranger to the question
purpose. Nonetheless, as
Mitchell v. N.C. Indus.
determine public purpose

of what activities are and are not a public
Justice (later Chief Justice) Sharpe wrote in
Dev. Fin. Auth., a slide-rule definition to
for all time cannot be formulated. Our recent

holdings in Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton and Maready

have employed a two-prong analysis to aid the determination of public
57
purpose in each case before us.'

The court then went on to apply Madison Cablevision's two-part test. 58
Thus, Piedmont Triad reinforces that "public purpose" must be
determined on a case-by-case basis and requires the application of the
two-prong analysis of Madison Cablevision. Even if job creation and

153. Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 624.

154. Id. at 724 (emphasis added).
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
Piedmont Triad Airport Auth. v. Urbine, 554 S.E.2d 331 (N.C. 2001).
Id. at 333 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id.
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economic development could meet the first prong of the Madison
Cablevision test, courts must evaluate the second prong to determine
whether the subsidies in question benefit the public generally, as
opposed to special interests or persons. It is useful in that regard to
examine North Carolina Supreme Court case law over the years on that
point.
Briggs v. City of Raleigh, et al.,"' decided the question of whether an
appropriation for the North Carolina State Fair was a public purpose.
The opinion written by Chief Justice Stacy expounded at length about
the means by which that question should be answered and what
constituted use for the public versus private interests, stating:
Indeed, it is well settled by all the decisions on the subject, with none to
the contrary, that the power of taxation may not be employed for the
purpose of establishing, aiding, or maintaining private business
enterprises, whose sole object is the individual gain of the proprietors,
no matter how beneficial to the community such enterprises may be.
The attempted exercise of the taxing power for such purposes was long
ago characterized as taxation to load the tables of the few with bounty
that the many may partake of the crumbs that fall therefrom. However
important it may be to the community that individual citizens should
prosper in their industrial enterprises, it is not the business of
government to aid them with its means.160
Thus, as far back as 1928, the supreme court recognized that while the
general community could benefit from the success of private businesses,
the government could not use its taxing power to aid those privileged
businesses. The court then continued:
The promotion of the interests of individuals, either in respect of
property or business, although it may result incidentally in the
advancement of the public welfare, is, in its essential character, a private
and not a public object. However certain and great the resulting good to
the general public, it does not, by reason of its comparative importance,
cease to be incidental. The incidental advantage to the public, or to the
state, which results from the promotion of private interests, and the
prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by
the use of public money raised by taxation, or for which taxation may
become necessary.1 6 1
The court again recognized that even though the resulting good to
the public was substantial, it was still an incidental advantage and
concluded with the assertion that it was a violation of constitutional
159. Briggs v. City of Raleigh, 141 S.E. 597 (N.C. 1928).

160. Id. at 600 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
161. Id. at 600-01.
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rights for government to use public funds for the benefit of a private
enterprise. The court explained:
The individual, by reason of his capacity, enterprise, or situation, might
be enabled to employ the money or property thus conferred upon him in
such a manner as to furnish employment to great numbers of the
community, to give a needed impulse to business of various kinds, and
thus promote the general prosperity and welfare. In this view, it might
be shown to be for the public good to take from the unenterprising [sic]
and thriftless their unemployed capital and intrust [sic] it to others who
will use it to better advantage for the interests of the community. But it
needs no argument to show that such an arbitrary exercise of power
would be a violation of the constitutional rights of those from whom the
money or property was taken, and an unjustifiable usurpation.1 6 2
In Nash v. Town of Tarboro, the court determined:
We deem it unnecessary to cite or discuss the long list of decisions of
this Court, dealing with the many things which have been held to fall
within the definition of a public purpose, such as streets, sidewalks,
bridges, water, light and sewerage plants, market houses, abattoirs,
municipal buildings, auditoriums, hospitals, playgrounds, parks,
railroads, armories, fairs and airports. Those decisions, in our opinion,
do not support the contention that the cost of constructing and
maintaining a hotel by a municipality is a public purpose within the
meaning

of our Constitution.

. .

. Certainly, a

tax could

not be

constitutionally levied to aid one in building or conducting a hotel; and
to exempt the keeper from the payment of the tax thereon is but doing
indirectly what cannot be done directly. 163
Then in 1968, the court addressed the constitutionality of industrial
development bonds in Mitchell v. N.C. Industrial Development Financing
6
Authority.'1
Justice Sharp set out the law in North Carolina, stating:
A slide-rule definition to determine public purpose for all time cannot be
formulated; the concept expands with the population, economy,
scientific knowledge, and changing conditions. As people are brought
closer together in congested areas, the public welfare requires
governmental operation of facilities which were once considered
exclusively private enterprises and necessitates the expenditure of tax
funds for purposes which, in an earlier day, were not classified as public.
Often public and private interests are so commingled that it is difficult to
determine which predominates. It is clear, however, that for a use to be

162. Id. at 601 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
163. Id. (quoting Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 42 S.E.2d 209, 212 (N.C. 1947)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
164. Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 159 S.E.2d 745 (N.C. 1968).
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public its benefits must be in common and not for particular persons,
interests, or estates; the ultimate net gain or advantage must be the
public's as contradistinguished from that of an individual or private.16 1

Our organic law prohibits the expenditure of public money for a private
purpose. It does not matter whether the money is derived by ad valorem
taxes, by gift, or otherwise. It is public money and under our organic law
public money cannot be appropriated for a private purpose or used for
the purpose of acquiring property for the benefit of a private concern. It
does not matter what such undertakings may be called or how
worthwhile they may appear to be at the passing moment. The financing
of private enterprises by means of public funds is entirely foreign to a
proper concept of our constitutional system. Experience has shown that
such encroachments will lead inevitably to the ultimate destruction of
the private enterprise system. 66

If public purpose is now to include State or municipal ownership and
operation of the means of production-even on an interim basis; if we
are to bait corporations which refuse to become industrial citizens of
North Carolina unless the State gives them a subsidy, the people
themselves must so declare. Such fundamental departures from well
established constitutional principles can be accomplished in this State
only by a constitutional amendment. 6 1

B.

Subsidies Arising from Contracts with Local Government andfrom
Special Legislation Primarily,If Not Exclusively Benefit the Recipient
and Violate the Madison Cablevision Test.

Again, considering North Carolina's special incentives for Dell
reveals the constitutional flaws with the state's incentives schemes.
Consider the incentives given to Dell by local governments. There, the
crux of the local subsidies at issue in that case consisted of:
(1) approximately $7,000,000 in direct grants for Dell's benefits that
cover the cost of buying the $7,000,000 tract of land; (2) direct grants to
Dell for approximately $14,500,000 to prepare the site for construction
of the facility; and (3) approximately $14,685,250 in direct grants to

165. Id. at 750 (internal citations omitted).
166. Id. at 755 (quoting State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So.2d 779, 784-85 (Fla.
1952)).

167. Id.at 760 (internal citations omitted).
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Dell to reimburse Dell for property taxes that would be paid.'
All of
these grants coming out of the general fund of two local governments
would have gone directly to Dell and were for Dell's sole benefit. Thus,
under the Madison Cablevision test, the court should have determined:
(1) whether these separate expenditures "involve[] a reasonable
connection with the convenience and necessity of the particular [local
governments]; and (2) whether the activit[es] benefit[] the public
generally, as opposed to special interests or persons."' 9
Even if it was conceded that these expenditures could somehow
have a "reasonable connection" with the "convenience and necessity" of
the local governments, they still unquestionably would fail the second
prong of Madison Cablevision because they primarily benefited Dell and
not the public. As conceded by the court of appeals, all of the benefits of
the expenditures directly and exclusively benefit Dell. Every dollar
given in grants going to reimbursements for purchasing the site, to
construction of infrastructure for the site, and to reimbursement of
property taxes, went straight to Dell's corporate bottom line.
Utilizing the Madison Cablevision test again, the specific incentives
born of special legislation like that at issue in Blinson fail to pass state
constitutional muster. Blinson involved three basic incentives at the
state level: (1) a tax credit of up to 100% for "large computer
manufacturers" against corporate income and corporate franchise tax
liability, with any additional credits permitted to be carried forward;
(2) enhancements to the Bill Lee Act credits for "major computer
facilities" against North Carolina corporate franchise tax, corporate
income tax, personal income tax, and estate and trust tax; and (3) a
refund of sales and use taxes paid on building materials, building
supplies, fixtures and equipment that becomes part of real property in
North Carolina. These subsidies total more than $242,000,000.170
Each of the above described tax credits and refunds were directed
exclusively to the recipient's benefit. Each dollar saved by using the
credits results in an equivalent increase in Dell's corporate bottom line.
Thus, the state's activity-special legislation targeted primarily, if not
exclusively, for a single cherry-picked corporation-benefits that
corporation and only that corporation. Because the benefit of these
incentive packages inure to the exclusive benefit of their respective

168. Amended Complaint & Petition for Declaratory Judgment at ex. H, Blinson v.
State, No. 05 CVS 8378, 2005 WL 6340135 (N.C. Super. Ct., Wake Co. Sep. 9, 2005).
169. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 624 (N.C. 1996) (quoting
Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 386 S.E.2d 200, 207 (N.C. 1989)).
170. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
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recipients, the state subsidy package for each also fails the second prong
of the Madison Cablevision test and is unconstitutional under article V,
section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution.
In Maready, the plaintiffs argued that the issue fell squarely within
the purview of Mitchell."' The majority of the court disagreed, and
while finding Mitchell distinguishable, did not overrule it.1 12 Thus,
Mitchell stands as good law and binding precedent on the constitutional
issue of applying the Public Purpose Clause to the subsidies under the
Dell Legislation and to the local subsidies. The Maready majority
attempted to distinguish that case from Mitchell in two respects: first in
Mitchell, the general assembly had unenthusiastically passed the
legislation, which was not the case in Maready;'13 and second, "the
holding in Mitchell clearly indicates that the Court considered private
industry to be the primary benefactor of the legislation and considered
any benefit to the public purely incidental."'" However, the Maready
majority then states that "[t]he Court rightly concluded that direct state
aid to a private enterprise, with only limited benefit accruing to the
public, contravenes fundamental constitutional precepts." 75
In Stanley v. Department of Conservation and Development, upon
which the plaintiffs in Maready also relied, it was noted that "[in
determining what is a public purpose the courts look not only to the end
sought to be attained but also 'to the means to be used."" 7 6
The Maready majority attempted to explain this away by relying on
article V, section 2(7) of the North Carolina Constitution, which was
adopted in 1973, as discussed in Hughey v. Cloninger.'7
"Under
subsection (7) [,] [d]irect-disbursementof public funds to private entities
is a constitutionally permissible means of accomplishing a public
purpose provided there is statutory authority to make such
appropriation."'
Hughey, however, was a case involving an
appropriation from the Gaston County Board of Commissioners to the
Dyslexia School of North Carolina."'7 The court in Hughey pointed out

171. Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 621.
172. Id. at 621-22.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 622.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Stanley v. Dep't of Conservation and Dev., 199 S.E.2d 641, 653 (N.C. 1973)
(quoting Turner v. Reidsville, 29 S.E.2d 211, 213 (N.C. 1944)).
177. Hughey v. Cloninger, 253 S.E.2d 898 (N.C. 1979).
178. Id. at 904 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 900.
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that the court of appeals had determined that a direct disbursement of
public funds to private entities, such as the Dyslexia School "(could) not
be the means used to effect a public purpose."" The supreme court,
however, explained that article V, section 2(7) enables the General
Assembly to "enact laws which permit the State, county, city or town, or
any other public corporation to 'contract with and appropriate money to
any person, association, or corporation for the accomplishment of public
purposes only.'"" 8 The court further noted that had there been statutory
authority for the appropriation to the Dyslexia School, no public
purpose problem would have existed since the "expenditures of public
funds for the education of the citizens of North Carolina are for a public
purpose."
Obviously, the circumstances in Hughey are a far cry from the facts
in Maready, as the weight of article V, section 2(7) on the determination
of the constitutionality of the specific subsidies at issue here is
negligible. This is not a situation where contracts are being entered into
whereby a private entity, for example, a garbage collection company, is
performing a public purpose and being compensated for it or an
appropriation to a Chamber of Commerce made to assist in corporate
Thus, the observation in Maready that "the constitutional
recruitment.
problem under the public purpose doctrine that the Court perceived in
Mitchell and Stanley no longer exists" simply is dicta.' 84 In fact, the
Maready opinion acknowledges the efficacy of Mitchell and its progeny
by stating that while they "remain pivotal in the development of the
doctrine, they do not purport to establish a permanent test." 181 While
not establishing a permanent and irrevocable test applicable in every
circumstance, the law in those cases remains binding precedent and
valid in analyzing the constitutionality of the Dell legislation at issue and
the application of section 158-7.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes
to the various subsidies at issue.

180. Id. at 903 (quoting Hughey v. Cloninger, 245 S.E.2d 543, 547 (N.C. Ct. App.
1978)).
181. Id. at 903-04 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. CONsT. art. V, § 2(7)).
182. Id. at 904 (citing Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank, 174 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1970)).
183. See Horner v. Chamber of Commerce, 68 S.E.2d 660, 663 (N.C. 1952) (declaring
unconstitutional an appropriation to chamber of commerce when the same was
commingled with other chamber funds and "indiscriminately used" to pay for chamber's
corporate functions, not just recruitment efforts).
184. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 623 (N.C. 1996).
185. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION

What remains to be seen is whether the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, which declined to review the Blinson decision, will weigh in on
the Commerce Clause issue and the excessively expansive public
purpose determination of Blinson and Peacock. The policy reasons for
reversing the tide of corporate welfare offered under the guise of
economic development and job creation are beyond the scope of this
Article.'86 Nevertheless, the constitutional mandates of the Commerce
Clause and the public purpose doctrine do not depend on policy debates
or political whim. These mandates, properly considered, do not allow
subsidies, grants or preferential tax treatment calculated to benefit North
Carolina at the expense of her sister states,'"' nor do they allow
government to use public resources to buoy select private industry."
Future cases should and must be resolved by resort only to the federal
and state constitutions for they are the cornerstone of all law.

186.
Pomp,
187.
188.

See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text; see also Peters & Fisher, Papke,
supra note 3; Enrich, supra note 4.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
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